Leadership and Management Style at Google Research Paper

Leadership and Management Style at Google - Research Paper Example According to Daft and Lane (2008, p.17), leadership develops â€Å"a compelling vision for the future and creates far-sighted strategies for producing the changes† required to achieve that vision. Thus, while leadership requires an eye on the long-term future, management calls for a focus on the bottom line and short-term results.   Shared Leadership at Google â€Å"Google’s goal is to organize the world’s information† (Duin & Baer, 2010, p.35). The company is ahead of schedule to meet its high target. The previous Chief Executive Officer at Google, Eric Schmidt has been replaced by Larry Page. In 2001 the Board of Directors of the company had brought in Schmidt to supervise the then 27-year-old founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. For one decade, Google’s management structure was described as a three-ring circus with the co-founders Page and Brin running the business behind the scenes, while Schmidt formed the public face. Currently, the three ma nagers who were equally involved in making decisions mutually agreed on Page taking the stage. Eric Schmidt stated that the earlier â€Å"triumvirate approach had real benefits in terms of shared wisdom† (Schermerhorn, Osborn, Uhlbien & Hunt, 2011, p.299) and that they would continue to discuss the big decisions among the three of them. At the same time, they decided to clarify their individual roles to ensure clear responsibility and accountability among the management and leadership of the company. The main aim is to simplify the leadership structure and speed up decision making. Thus, Larry Page leads product development and technology strategy, his greatest strengths; and as Google’s Chief Executive Officer is also in charge of the company’s day-to-day operations. Sergey Brin as co-founder focuses on strategic projects and new products, while the previous CEO Schmidt â€Å"serves as executive chairman working externally on deals, partnerships, customers, an d government outreach† (Schermerhorn et al, 2011, p.299). The company’s leadership is confident that this focused approach would serve Google and its users well in the future. It is acknowledged that Page’s taking over the company’s management is at an ideal time. Google’s business is doing well, with the revenues of $29.3 billion showing an increase of 24% from the previous year, and profits rising high. However, the concern is for the future rather than for the present. There is a sense that Google’s best days may be over, with the company facing tough competition from Facebook and Microsoft, and losing top talent to younger tech shops.

Emotional Skills In Social Work Practice

Emotional Skills In Social Work Practice Social Work Practice, a powerful modern day skill for social empowerment of the disadvantaged and excluded segments of society, is an occupation of enormous scope and an immensely stressful activity (Burgess Taylor, 2004). Educated and trained in social work theory and practice, these practitioners are required to constantly interact, assess and understand situations, as well engage in various actions aimed at providing appropriate relief and succour to their disadvantaged clients (Burgess Taylor, 2004). This calls for significant knowledge of the tenets of social work practice. However, social workers in the UK function in an increasingly management oriented setting which is more organisational and administrative, with an emphasis on private public participation, accountability and coordination (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 7 to 81). Increasing competition between social work providers, business-oriented standards for performance assessment, mounting work pressures and the need to micro manage and carefully control the distribution of services often lead to personal dilemmas, contradictory emotions and disorientation (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 7 to 81). Significant failures in social work have brought to the fore various challenges facing social workers in processing and comprehending their own emotions and actions, as well as those of others (Perez-Koenig Rock, 2001, P 25 to110). Modern day behavioural experts and psychologists feel that much of the reasons behind such failures lie in the inadequacies of traditionally followed training approaches, which deal primarily with the inculcation of practical and theoretical competencies and ignore broader and more holistic emotional issues (Perez-Koenig Rock, 2001, P 25 to110). Adequate attention to emotional issues in the training and development of social workers is felt to be critically important for (a) aligning the emotional dimensions of social work, which, while essential, is rendered invisible, with the natural caring roles of social workers (b) providing supportive agendas for individual and professional development (c) providing processes to define the emotional constituent of social work practice that is obliterated by the increase of managerial practices in the area, (d) tackling the disruptive power of emotions on thought, (e) creating an effective balance between rational and emotional reactions for making of sensible and wise decisions, and (f) bridging cultural differences (Turner, 2005). Whilst the origins of Emotional Intelligence (EI) can be traced back to the works of Darwin, its modern day emergence, as a serious and relevant issue for study and application in various areas of work that involve people, arose first with the work of Robert Maslow in 1960, followed by those of John Mayer and Peter Salovey in 1989. Peter Salovey described EI as the ability to monitor ones own and others feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide ones thinking and actions (Nelson Others, 2007, P 30). The concept of EI received a boost with the work of the psychologist Daniel Goleman, who popularised it, first with his 1995 book Emotional intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ and thereafter through constant research and work on the subject (Nelson Others, 2007, P 30). Goleman has developed a number of EI competencies in two specific areas of EI, personal competence and social competence, and has encouraged the inclusion of EI in the education and training module of social work (Nelson Others, 2007, P 30). This essay deals with the various ramifications of EI in social work and its use and application for fresh entrants, educated and trained in the area, principally in three specific disciplines; counselling, conflict management and social work practice, 2. EI in Counselling New entrants in the area of social work counselling will be required to help people of various ages from different segments of society to confront and overcome a diverse range of problems and challenges (Payne Shardlow, 2002, P122 to 198). Counsellors aim to provide people with the guidance and support they require to alter their lives and move forward in a constructive manner. Social work counselling can loosely be segregated into (a) counselling and therapy (assisting clients with different emotional problems) (b) providing advice and information in areas related to jobs, employment choices, welfare, rights, debt, etc. (c) social and community care, (helping with providing of support to families, young and old people, and those without homes or with disabilities) and (d) charities and other voluntary organisations (providing support to workers to collect funds and organise volunteers in order to continue their operations (Payne Shardlow, 2002, P122 to 198). Recent years have seen an increasing conflict between the managerial and administrative functions of social workers and their requirement to meet individuals at the time of their need, give them respect, battle disadvantages and unfairness, construct relationships that resolve problems, and support wellbeing (Payne Shardlow, 2002, P122 to 198). People in need of counselling have time and again requested to be treated with dignity and respect, to be patiently listened to and helped (Payne Shardlow, 2002, P122 to 198). Effective counselling requires social workers to listen carefully, react effectively and build relationships with service users, colleagues and others (Payne Shardlow, 2002, P122 to 198). Golemans four core competencies, namely self awareness, self management, social awareness, and relationship management can be of immense help to new counsellors by enabling them to understand personal emotions and their effect on other people, as well as by developing the ability to control strong emotions that can upset service users (Druskat Others, 2006, P 72 to 145). Inculcation of social awareness enables new counsellors to recognise the emotional condition of their clients, bridge cultural and social distances and understand the challenges and difficulties experienced by service users (Druskat Others, 2006, P 72 to 145). Relationship management on the other hand equips counsellors to converse with service users, persuades them to listen to and understand the suggestions of the counsellor, and build strong bonds (Druskat Others, 2006, P 72 to 145). The principles of client centred therapy, popularised by Carl Rogers, require counsellors to refrain from unsettling clients with queries, evaluations, judgments, and explanations, but to focus upon providing secure, non-judgemental and caring environments, where the service users can control counselling sessions, decide what is discussed, and find their individual solutions to existing problems without requiring the counsellors to fix the course of therapy (Mulhauser, G, (2009, P 1). Carl Rogers based his framework on the belief that individuals become progressively more truthful and dependable once they realise that their subjective understanding is appreciated and accepted. Rogers core conditions, better known as CUE, consist of Congruence, Unconditional Positive Regard, and Empathy (Mulhauser, G, (2009, P 1). These three conditions are of extreme importance in client-centred counselling and new counsellors need to inculcate a deep understanding of them in order to provide requisite conditions for clients who have a strong desire to explore their feelings and who treasure personal responsibility. Such an approach may however be unsuitable for clients who wish to be provided with extensive advice, diagnosis of problems and analysis of their problems (Mulhauser, G, (2009, P 1). Clients who would like to address specific psychological habits or patterns of thinking may find some variation in the helpfulness of the person-centred approach, as the individual therapeutic styles of person-centred counsellors vary widely, and some will feel more able than others to engage directly with these types of concerns. (Mulhauser, 2009, P 1) Whilst newly inducted counsellors need to be careful about the requirement of their clients, the use of emotional skills is often necessary and needs to be fully inculcated by counsellors. 3. EI in Conflict Management Social workers, especially those taking up positions in social work organisations, understand that their work will often deal with conflict and that too in various roles, as advocates, negotiators and mediators (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Social work education comprises of a wide range of perspectives, (like environmental, radical and feminist), which in turn are based upon dissimilar premises regarding human relationships (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Social work practice requires different approaches from different perspectives in case of intervention for resolution or management of situations of conflict (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Examples of such situations (in terms of the above perspectives) could include interface between individuals and their social environments, confronting patriarchy, or challenging discrimination and oppression against a wide range of groups, including women, lesbians, gays and ethnic minorities (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Conflict resolution training for social workers provides numerous principles for successful conflict resolution, like (a) the need for different responses for different conflicts, (b) the availability of different responses like avoidance, accommodation, competition, compromise or collaboration for bringing about solutions, (c) the need of people to feel secure from physical or emotional hazards, (d) the availability of various skills for conflict resolution skills like refraining, active listening, and identification of underlying interests, and (e) the need to balance emotions with rationality (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Social workers are undoubtedly aware of the lack of emotional intelligence being the main cause of conflict (Lenaghan Others, 2006, P 76+). Researchers in EI also argue that a lack of emotional intelligence is one of the leading causes of conflict in our society (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Contemporary training tools make significant use of Goldmans principles on EI, particularly self-confidence, emotional self-control, transparency, empathy, motivation and relationship management (Turner, 2005, P136 to 217). Golemans work makes a valuable contribution to conflict management theory and training, and a compelling case for the importance of emotion in what we believe to be rational decision-making processes (Bjerknes HYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bioHYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bio Paranica, 2002, P1). Golemans theories constructively help social workers understand the important role of emotion in life and the reliance placed upon emotional input for making decisions and prioritisation of information. This greatly helps in minimising conflict in personal and working life (Bjerknes HYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bioHYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bio Paranica, 2002, P1). Solid training that focuses on developing awareness about our strengths and weaknesses as mediators, facilitators and trainers is crucial to our development as culturally competent process workers, and is crucial in our pursuit to help clients achieve their potential. Openness to learning and reflecting about our role, about who we are, and about how we affect others is essential and will lead us down the path to success in life. (Bjerknes HYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bioHYPERLINK http://www.mediate.com/articles/bjerknes.cfm#bio Paranica, 2002, P1) 4. EI in Social Work Practice Social Work practitioners are required to interact with service users, social workers and other participants of the social care system like medical practitioners, teachers and members of local authorities (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172). With the interaction between social workers and service users being the focal point of social work practice, the relationship between social worker and service user involves perception on the part of the practitioner, appreciation of the emotions of the client and usage of perceptions to handle situations and achieve efficiency in delivery of social care (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172). Such work demands a high degree of emotional intelligence (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172). Social work in the present context does not extend only to the assessment and fulfilment of perceived social needs (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172), but also to the realisation of and respect for the service users goals, choices, and preferences and the use of interdisciplinary resources available with the social worker to meet their emotional, social, physical and economic needs. Social workers need to engage in active introspection of events, try to obtain a clear psychological understanding of the challenges and needs of service users and inculcate genuine concern for the economically and socially disadvantaged and excluded (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172). Whilst such perceptions cannot be generalised because of the different needs of different people, the inculcation of empathy and service orientation facilitates the development of necessary perspectives and perceptions (Burgess Taylor, 2004, P 101 to 172). Social workers entering practice should recognise that they need to confront their own emotions as well as those of their service users, especially so in cases where the issues are extremely challenging and difficult to resolve. Goleman identifies five EQ domains as (a) knowledge of own, (b) management of own emotions, (c) motivating oneself, (d) recognising and understanding emotions of other people, and (e) management of relationships, i.e. the management of emotions of other people (Druskat Others, 2006, P 152 to 189). Experts also agree that EI, along with reflective ability enables social workers to increase their resilience to stress (Druskat Others, 2006, P 152 to 189). Self awareness and self management competencies help social workers to progressively develop self confidence, transparency, and optimism (Druskat Others, 2006, P 152 to 189). Social awareness and relationship management on the other hand allow them to engage positively with their clients as well as with other participants in the social care structure (Druskat Others, 2006, P 152 to 189). It is unfortunate that current research reports still underline the need for social workers to have more empathy for their clients. They found that being listened to and understood was crucial for the carers. Staff who took time to ask questions and hear complex and long stories of how the family were coping was seen as the most helpful. These findings confirm previous ones and it is of great concern that people using services are still identifying that only some social workers are proficient in such crucial and basic skills. (Sedan, 2005, P 7) It is being constantly proved that the difference between the better social workers and the others can be narrowed down to skills like listening, non-critical acceptance, avoidance of moralistic or judgemental attitudes and other competencies directly related to EI. New social workers need to heed such findings and focus strongly on improving their EI and E skills. 5. Conclusions The principles of EI, when they were first elaborated by Mayor and Salovey raised significant interest in a world that was becoming increasingly competitive and insensitive; the possibility of people being able to adopt techniques and behaviours to work with greater cooperation, harmony and productivity was welcomed with enthusiasm. The path breaking work on the subject by Goleman in following years and the adoption of the tenets of EI in various areas of human endeavour, more noticeably in social work and in the HR functions of business firms, have resulted in its increasing popularity and application. As is evident, EI can be applied in numerous areas by social work practitioners; it is an extremely useful skill and can be used productively in counselling, conflict management and various other areas of social work practice. Whilst interest in the area of human needs and actualisation has increased since the publication of Maslows theories, the evolution of specific theory on the issue has added a new dimension to the area by developing methods for people to increase their E skills and improve the quality and productivity of their working and personal lives. Recent entrants to social work however need to realise that E skills and EI can increase only with constant inculcation and application of its principles and bare knowledge of theoretical tenets will not suffice in improving their EI competencies. With the tools and methods of improving EI still in the primary stages development, much more needs to be done to popularise the issue and encourage its application in various areas of social work. The Boston EI questionnaire provides a good method of assessing personal EI, which is in consonance with the Five Step Method for improvement of emotional quotient (Druskat Others, 2006, P 225). Younger social workers would be well advised to sincerely take the test and constantly improve their EI.

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility by Harry Frankfurt Ess

In â€Å"Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility†, Harry Frankfurt attempts to falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is the principle where a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. A person would be morally responsible for their own actions if done by themselves. If someone else had forced that person to do the action, then the person doing the action is not morally responsible. Frankfurt does not believe this to be true and that the person doing the action is morally responsible. Frankfurt’s objections towards the Principle of Alternate Possibilities shows the refutation of natural intuition and places moral responsibility upon those who deserve it. Frankfurt’s â€Å"Black and Jones† example is an appropriate explanation for how the Principle of Alternative Possibilities works. Black put a gun on Jones’ head and tells him to do action A. According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, this will play out in three ways. If Jones was not a reasonable man and was â€Å"gung-ho†, not caring about any consequences or cost, then he is not to be morally responsible for that action. If Jones was afraid of what Black will do with the gun and decides to change his decision from doing any other action to action A, then he is only morally responsible for the decision that he made earlier and not for the action. If Jones isn’t affected by Black’s actions, but he considers those actions in planning to make his next move yet still follows his original decision, then he is morally responsible for all actions and decisions.(Frankfurt; Watson, 169-170) What Frankfurt is considering to be a counter-e xample to the Principle of Alternate Possibil... ...ow moral responsibility. One needs to will other alternate possibilities, knowing that there is no moral responsibility for them, to show that the original will has moral responsibility. It is like placing a white stone on a pile of black stones to emphasize the fact that that one stone is a white stone. This shows the need for alternate possibilities and strengthens Frankfurt’s argument. In conclusion, Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities showed that people under coercion had moral responsibility for their own actions. Copp placed the value of moral responsibility to the ability of being able to do one’s will and Pereboom supports Frankfurt’s argument by placing the robustness condition on alternate possibilities. This shows that there is still a need to put more thought and brainstorming into who has the moral responsibility.

The Lost Treasure

Jahdai Dunk The Lost Treasure When reminiscing on a special moment in time there is delight, fear, or humiliation that may be remembered; teaching a message in the long run. While many people learn through past memories, I also have been taught a lesson about God always being with me while on my trip to Lake Tahoe. It is known to be an amazing place where families enjoy themselves and vacation like there is no end. People have this perfect vision of beautiful green trees, skiing, camping, and great family memories when reflecting on Lake Tahoe.While I think about the holiday I spent there and listen to the words Lake Tahoe, I keep in mind a beautiful location; but also a regretful memory that in the long run changed my mindset about the love God has for me. It all started on a damp, foggy morning around 6am, I felt my heartbeat jumping like a pogo stick. It was the morning of Christmas! Santa Clause and presents leaped all through my mind that morning. I slowly opened my eyes, yawned , and finally sprinted through the narrow hall way to my family room exploding with excitement.Rapidly, I opened up my gifts and I first (saw) distinguished a green bible and a black and pink purse. I thanked my parents for these gifts, but when I opened the final item I was even more joyous seeing an item I thought I would’ve never (seen) set eyes on in years. It was a brand new flip phone! I (ran) raced to my parents and screamed, â€Å"Thank you mommy, and thank you daddy! † Alarmed by my (screaming) shrieking cry my brother thought, â€Å"Why does she get a phone at such a young age, she’s only 10? † Obtaining my phone I was ecstatic, but when grasping the other items, I wasn’t as energized.Assuming I was so tight with my grey, wireless flip phone, I strutted with great confidence out of the house; viewing it to be one of the best days of my 4th grade life. I was in complete shock to be carrying such a precious device. After treasuring my first phone I was eager to go to Lake Tahoe for some more enjoyment. A few days following Christmas around 8 am, I quickly packed my belongings, (carried) lugged my new purse along with my bible and phone, on my way to Lake Tahoe. It took about 4 hours to get to our destination and I felt like a fat walrus while sitting in the car for such a long period of time.Hours later around noon, I woke up and examined my surroundings outside. I screamed, â€Å"Oh my goodness, we are here! † Immediately, I grabbed my black leather purse that had my phone and bible, took a breath in tasting the refreshing air of civilization, and had a mindset eager to play some activities in the area. The main entertainments in the area of gorgeous Lake Tahoe were the outdoor shopping centers across the street from our hotel with a variety of antique stores, food places, casinos, a tram and arcades. Although the city was filled with numerous fun and phenomenal activities, I thought the top place for enjoymen t was the arcade.My family and I began to stridden around trying to find an arcade, but unfortunately couldn’t locate one at the moment. I began to sniffle and was filled with salty tears. As I (looked) appeared gloomy and walked through the winding outdoor shopping centers, it started to reach evening. I then wiped those tears away when my mom told me and my siblings that there was an arcade inside a very smoky place. I realized this unbearable scented building happened to be a casino with an arcade inside! Cheerfully, we leaped with joy unmindful of the smoke, ready to run as if it was Christmas again yelling, â€Å"Let’s go! †My family and I ran inside dodging the smells of smolder left and right, covered up our noses, held our breath, huddled in close, and finally spotted in the corner was the arcade. I asked my parents for money and swiftly sprinted like there was no limit to play several games. There were so many games and the prizes were pleasing to my ey es, therefore my goal was to get a huge amount of tickets. I went left and right (going) departing from game to game with a huge smile on my face. As I came to a satisfaction of my amount of tickets, I finished with one final game, which was known as the irresistible roller coaster game.My body rattled feeling the movements of a jiggling massage chair giving me the urge to raise my hands as if I was on a real roller coaster. Before leaving I picked out my little prizes with unspeakable joy and quickly went to the restroom as though everything was alright; but what I didn’t know was part of me was about to be lost that day. Skipping back with my toys in my hand, I was ready to go back for some more games as if I just left Disneyland. I was being thrown with happiness almost back at our hotel just two blocks ahead, realizing something was incomplete. I frantically shouted, â€Å"Uh oh, where’s my urse! † My massive smile turned into sorrow. My mom in worry answere d, â€Å"I don’t know, where was the last place you saw it? † Out of breath with tears beginning to come down my face I anxiously sighed, â€Å"The arcade! † Rewinding my steps I ran like it was the end of the world all the way back to the arcade in great concern because that purse had my brand new phone inside of it! We passed one block then two with a huge change in emotion. My sensitive heart skipped a step every stride of the way. Then finally we arrived at the arcade hastily trying to retrace our steps.We went back through the jungle of smoke and at last making it to the arcade. I went to each and every game forcing myself to remember what I did with the purse. Not being able to find the purse in the arcade, my dad and mom checked the security station. Rushing back eager to hear the news my mom said, â€Å"The security found the purse and your bible was still there, but they took the phone! † My tears turned into sobs as I heard those terrible words. I never realized how much an attitude could change from being joyous one moment to regret the next. All I could think was, â€Å"My parents will never get me a phone until I’m fifty years old! Every time I think about Lake Tahoe or hear those words, I always reminisce about the loss of my first phone. Although I believed my phone was a prized possession then, I now realize that the treasure that was left behind was my real prize. An item such as my bible that I wasn’t fond of when opening at Christmas, opened up my eyes years later to understanding that God expresses his love in the most amazing ways. While I thought lost my most prized possession, perhaps I never lost it all. Perhaps it was there all the time in the form of an even greater possession that lasts forever which was appreciating God’s love through the bible.

Freund

Creating Deviance Rules: A Macroscopic Model Author(s): Ronald J. Troyer and Gerald E. Markle Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 157-169 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/4106327 Accessed: 16/11/2009 09:18 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email  protected] org. Blackwell Publishing and Midwest Sociological Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Sociological Quarterly. http://www. jstor. org The SociologicalQuarterly (Spring1982):157-169 23 Deviance Rules: Creating A Macroscopic Model* RonaldJ. Troyer,Drake University GeraldE. Markle,Western MichiganUniversity In this paperwe proposea macrolevel the modelfor analyzing creationof deviance rules. We begin by placingthe phenomenon withinthe contextof the social factist and social definitionist the sociological traditions, identifying insightsand difficulties the socialproblems We rule creation. sugliterature for deviance presents explaining difficulties be resolvedby lacingthe processwithina can gest that the theoretical The consequent dialecticalmodel of deviance framework. sociologyof knowledge is that society is composedof a numberof designation based on the assumption in of definitions deviance generalinterests varying degreesof conflictwithprevailing outcomes previous of This balanceor accommodation contests. becomes representing vulnerable with the introduction increasein strainwhich is a potentialresource or for inte rest a The groupsdesiring new definition. utcomeof the ensuingconflictis seen as dependent the abilityof the combatants employresources the battle. in on to We concludeby identifying advantages model has for studying deviance the the the rulecreation process. of This is how I treat theory: it is somethingto guide our understanding the social world; it helps us throughthe labyrinthof the buzzingconfusion of conflictingideologies, and, most of all, theory liberatesus from dead facts and worn-out myths. Davis 1980:xv) But since those sociologistswho espouse a strong and explicit determinism,and those who practice the techniquesof â€Å"verstehen,† â€Å"empathy,†and â€Å"takingthe actor'spoint of view,† differ upon so very many issues, technical and otherwise, the present suggestions are more likely to be treated as a pollution of the boundarybetween schools of thought than as a pathway to agreement. (Barnes, 1974:83-84) For decades the sociology of deviance focus ed on rule violation. This approach produced works on rule violators, described which rules were violated and how they were violated, and, arguably, why they were violated. Largely neglected in this work was the process by which rules were created; that is, the process by which deviant categories and designations were constructed. Recently scholars have begun to focus attention on this issue, resulting in various empirical case studies or rationales for the import of the collective definition process (Nuehring and Markle, 1974; Conrad, 1975; Pfohl, 1977; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977; Levine, 1978; Schneider, 1978; Markle and Troyer, 1979; Conrad and Schneider, 1980. As with many deviance studies, these efforts have not produced an explicit framework relating rule creation to the broader theoretical conceptions of social processes and the structural order. As a remedy, ? 1982 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/82/1300-0157$00. 75 *The authors thank Roland Chilton, Ronald Kramer, Frances McCrea, Joseph W. Schneider, Malcolm Spector, and Mayer Zald for their helpful comments. Ronald J. Troyer's address is Department of Sociology, Dr ake University, Des Moines, Iowa 50311. 158 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY Collins has called for a radicaldeparture deviancestudies,statfrom traditional ing that â€Å"thenext step clearlymustbe to abolishthe field of devianceentirely,to and link its materialswith what is knownof generalexplanations stratification of politics† (1975:17). And Davis (1980:5) has observedthat the time has come â€Å"for the sociology of deviance to move into mainstreamtheory–based sociology. † What theoreticalform ought these investigations take? The developments in sociologicaltheoryin the past few decadeshave been focusedaroundtwo dominant perspectives. The nature of these approachescan best be graspedby referringto Ritzer's (1975) distinctionbetween the social factist and social definitionist paradigms. The social factist is primarilyconcernedwith the cause of social phenomena; thus the questionasked is a why question. By contrast,since the social definitionist more concernedwith process,the researchquestionis a is how question. In studyingdeviance,for example,the social factistshave focused on behaviordescribing extent and natureasking†Whydo thesepeople do it? † its focusedon the process On the otherhand, the social definitionists have primarily Howhavethesepersons as asking by whichpeoplecometo be defined deviant the label? † acquired deviant have and Webelieve the theoretical of that efforts thefactists thedefinitionists been useful. Such work, though clearly the creationand social constructionof of scholars,is necessaryif the study of rule creationis to lead to generalizations wider applicability. Towardthat e nd, we reviewsome relevantliterature, develop creation a sociologyof knowledgeframework, then presenta macrodeviance and model which attemptsto bridge the gap between the factist and definitionist erspectives. Literature between PerhapsArmandMauss has best capturedthe essence of the difference the two majortraditionalapproachesto social problemstheory. The essence of the scholarlydisagreement, noted, came down to one grouparguingthat â€Å"sohe cial problems are ‘objective'realities which generate collective behavior and political action†versus the view that â€Å"socialproblemsare essentiallygenerated by collectivebehaviorand politicalprocesses†(1977:602, emphasisin original). The former closely approximatesthe social factist approach,while the latter the represents social definitionist position. Social factist scholarshave tended to explain social problemsas the product of some environmentally condition. This tradition, disharmonious usuallytermed the strain explanation,has often focused on economic conditions (Oberschall, between differentgoals, differentvalues, 1973) but also includes discrepancies values and norms, knowledgeand actions, technologyand values, and so forth (Smelser, 1962: chap. 3). Smelser,for example,indicatesthat â€Å"norm-oriented movements†(definedas attemptsto restore,protect,modify,or createnormsin the name of a generalizedbelief,† 1962:270) often springfrom the following kindsof strain: Sometimes the appearanceof new knowledge initiates a movement to apply this knowledge in order to eradicate a condition previously taken for granted. (1962: 287) CreatingDeviance Rules 159 can betweennormative and standards actualsocialconditions proAny disharmony videthe basisfor a movement whoseobjective is to modifynorms. 1962:289) it Davis (1975) used a strainmodel to explain changesin the collectivedefinition of deviance. Whileseeingdeviancedefinitions productsof powerstruggles as between groups with new rules representing values of those groups able to the win state endorsement their values, Davis suggeststhat â€Å"the diffusionof new of knowledgeis a majorcause of collective searchesfor new normsin the modern world†(1975:53). Although strain h as been a populartheoreticalapproachfor studyingsome social problems(e. g. race riots), few empiricalstudiesof deviancedesignation have followed from this tradition. PerhapsChamblisscame close in the study of the creation of new rules against vagrancy. In his words, â€Å"The vagrancy statutes emerged as a result of changes in other parts of the social structure† (1964:69). Specifically,the strain was the breakdownof the serf system; vagrancy laws were the responseof the rulingclass to protect their interestsand bring the system back to harmony. Zurcheret al. (1977) have also pointed to the crucial role of strainin the emergenceof antipornography crusades. In the communities amongstatus studied,they found that as a resultof inconsistencies variables,the traditionalmiddle class was experiencingthreatsto its life-style. were attemptsto the Consequently, effortsto gain new rulesagainstpornography bolster the legitimacyof their life-style. In other words, in the strain tradition of new definitionsof devianceare seen as responsesto the introduction various kindsof socialchangein society. Insteadof focusingon the causes of social problems,such as strain(objective traditionstressthat collective acconditions), scholarsin the social definitionist tions emergefrominteraction, processes. As Blumerstated: especiallyinterpretive â€Å"social problemslie in and are productsof a process of collective definition† (1971:301). Spector and Kitsuse (1977) pursuedthis theme with their argument that scholarsmust focus on the claims-making the process to understand emergenceof a social problemor definitionof deviance. This processtraditionhas spawneda varietyof empiricalstudies,often focusdefinitionsof deviance. The ing on the creationof criminaland health-related best known of these studies is Becker's (1963) analysisof the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. Arguingthat there was no majorincreasein the actualuse of the drug, which would be the focus of a strain explanation,Becker attributesthe new rule to the activitiesof a â€Å"moralentrepreneur. † (For other interpretations, see Dickson, 1968; Galliherand Walker, 1977, 1978. ) Other studies have argued that juvenile courts were not created as a responseto increasesin delinquency,as the strainmodel would predict,but ratheras part of a moralcrusade of (Platt, 1969) or as the productof organizational conflictbetweensupporters the police and probationdepartments (Hagan and Leon, 1977). In two studies of sex offensedefinitions,Rose (1977) and Roby (1969) also emphasizeprocessualexplanations. Roby examinedchanges in the New York State penal law on prostitution and found that the relative power of numerous interest groups and individuals determined the final version of the act. Similarly, Rose related the rise of the â€Å"rape problem† to the ideology and organizations generated by the women's liberation movement. 160 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY of The status politics interpretation the temperancemovementby Gusfield in (1963, 1967) representsanotherone of the majorprocessualapproaches the literature. Basically,Gusfieldsuggeststhat the attemptsto have a behaviordesignated as deviantare often symbolicbattles†betweenopposedsystemsof moralities, culturesand stylesof life† (1963:173). In otherwords,it is not the behavior per se or social conditionswhich cause the attemptto label the behavioras deviant. Instead the designationof deviance must be seen as a productof status of for conflict,the competition the officialassignment honorand prestigethrough of legitimation groupnorms. The creationof new health-related of designations deviancehas been reviewed Conrad and Schneider(1980). These authorshave set forth a â€Å"sequential by of model† and â€Å"grounded on generalizations† the medicalization deviance. Following Spectorand Kitsuse,they emphasizethe import,and not the accuracy,of medicalclaims-making, view claims as strategicdevices, and view medicalization which reflectpolitics and demedicalization devianceas â€Å"cyclicalphenomena† of of the day. In the most recent processualanalysis,Schursuggeststhat deviancemust be seen as a politicalphenomenon. Arguingthat there are at least two sides in any stigmacontest, Schursuggeststhat what is really at stake in deviancedefinitions is the power of the respectivegroups. Since â€Å"power,of any sort, is more like a processthan an object† (1980:8), â€Å"deviancedefiningis not a static event but a continuousand changingprocess†(1980:66). In summary,the literaturereviewed above suggests two models for understandingthe collectivedefinitionof deviance. The process approacharguesthat collectivedefinitionsare the productof interestgroupdynamics. By contrastthe are is for, strainexplanation that societaldisjunctions responsible or at least play a majorrole in, the emergence new definitions. of BeyondDichotomousModels During the past decade, a numberof scholarshave attemptedto move beyond the raditionalstrainor processmodels. For example,Mauss (1975; Maussand of Wolfe, 1977) arguesthat new social problemsor new definitions devianceare best understoodas productsof social movementsled by interestgroups. In this view, social arrangements permit collective behaviorwhich usually focuses on structural strainsbroughtaboutby social change. Thoughmanys trainsare present in society, problem definitionis the product of interest groups organizing social movementswhich push for acceptanceof their definitionof reality. Resource mobilizationtheory is another attemptto move beyond the strain and process models. This framework begins with the assumptionthat society is composedof competinggroups (economic, status, racial,etc. ). Strainis always present,since thereis conflictamonggroupsover whichvalues,norms,economic and arrangements, so forth are to prevailin the society. Group conflictand the of social movementsare analyzedin terms of the abilityof the colemergence lectivities to create and mobilize resources (Oberschall, 1973). A dynamic element is introduced into the analysis: authorities as well as challengers possess resources; deployment by one side requires some kind of response (mobilization of additional resources) from the other side, lest the cause be defaulted. CreatingDeviance Rules 161 Marxistapproaches have also triedto move beyondstrainand processmodels. of Initially Marxist/conflict interpretations new rules defining deviance suggested that they were â€Å"firstand foremosta reflectionof the interestsof the governingclass† (Chambliss,1974:37). In this view â€Å"thestate and legal systemare seen as instruments which can be manipulated,almost at will, by the capitalist class† (Beirne, 1979:379), an approachillustratedby Platt's (1974) reinterpretation of the establishmentof the juvenile court as a conscious effort by SomeMarxcapitaliststo preserveexistingpoliticaland economicarrangements. ists have assigneda more ambiguous role to the state (Block, 1978), suggesting that it exercises a â€Å"relativeautonomy†in its relationship the capitalistclass to the enactmentof legislationis not alwaysin (Beirne, 1979:379). Consequently, the objectiveinterestsof the capitalistclass, â€Å"but each case must be examined from and empirically on its own merits†(Beirne, 1979:380). Whatis important, this position,is that all of this occurswithinthe boundaries providedby the prevailing structuralrelations. Lauderdaleand Inveraritycriticizedthe early conflict approachesfor inadequately examiningthe politicalprocessunderlyingthe creationof deviance. Arguingthat â€Å"devianceis socially definedand as such is and changedthroughpoliticalprocesses†(1980a:36), they created,maintained, ask underwhat conditionsa form of actioncomes to be definedas deviant(Lauderdale, 1980:v). Noting previousstudiesare characterized a â€Å"preoccupation by with subjectiveinterestsand lack of attentionto measuringobjectiveinterests† (1980b:229), they call for attentionto objectiveconditionsunderlyingthe deviance definitionprocess. These efforts are advancesover analyses which attributenew definitionsof devianceto social psychological processesor to the activitiesof individuals(moral entrepreneurs). Here, at least, an effortis made to locate the deviancewithin the larger social context. However, several issues remainunresolved. First, although recent effortshave attemptedto find a role for objectiveconditions,the remainsunclear. At role of strainin the generation new deviancedesignations of one group of scholars,the social definitionists, suggestobjectivecondipresent tions are largely irrelevant,while others (especially Lauderdaleand Inverarity, to 1980b) are callingfor moreattention objectivefactors. A second majorunresolvedproblemis that none of the collectivedefinitionof deviance approachesexplains why specific behaviorsare selected for deviance silent on this issue. Finally, In categorization. fact, the literatureis remarkably the approachesdiscussedabove do not yet explainwhy some deviancecreation effortsare unsuccessful. is in this contextthat we believe that resourcemobiliIt zation theory could prove valuable in the study of rule creationand deviance designation. Not only does it point toward relevantvariablesfor study, it also to providesan empiricalframework assess previousmovementsand predictthe successor failureof ongoingmovements. Any model or theory of deviance creation must addressthese issues. More into a more genspecifically,a way must be found to subsumethese differences eral model rendering theoreticalissues amenableto empiricalevaluation. Toward a Sociology of Knowledge Given its theoretical import, it seems to us that there have been inexplicably few 162 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY studiesof rule creation. Marxists,subsuming issue withinthe superstructure, the have focusedon the creationof laws whichmaintainruling-class privilege. Strain scholarstreat new rules as responsesto changedsocial conditions(new knowledge, Davis, 1975). Only process scholars have directly addressedthe issue, viewing collective definitionsof devianceas â€Å"emergent productsof an interpretive process† (Hawkins and Tiedman, 1975:340), but studies in this tradition have not produceda rigoroustheoreticalexplanation. Instead, isolated studies have been characterized descriptiveand idiosyncratic detail withoutconnecby or tion to socialstructure generalsocialprocesses. In theirstudyof the medicalization deviance,Conradand Schneider(1980) of a solutionto the interactionist the pose impasse. Although labeling-interactionist of perspectivepresentsus with the questionsto ask concerningthe development deviancedesignations,† they note (1980:20), â€Å"it is a sociologyof knowledgeapproachthat is necessaryto answerthem. â€Å"We thinkof the sociologyof knowledge knowlas a study of the materialbasis of social ideas, categories,designations, and so forth. From this frameworkthe dependentvariablechanges: no edge, longer do we studyth e deviantactor;ratherwe attemptto locate historicallythe origins and the social forces which supportedand opposed the definitionof the deviant category. As Friedsonhas stated, the analysisshouldnot focus on â€Å"the etiology of some state so much as the etiology of the meaningof a state. Thus it asks questionslike: How does a state come to be considereddeviant? How does it come to be considered kindof devianceratherthan another? † one (1970: 215-16). deviant To developtheirknowledgeapproach, Conradand Schneider interpret behaviorsas social constructionsof reality. Adopting Berger and Luckmann's as (1966) scheme,they view realityconstruction a social processof threestages: The processbegins with the and internalization. xternalization, objectification, of construction a culturalproductor definition a personor collectionof perby becomespartof the generallyacceptedbody sons, continuesas the new definition of knowledge,and concludesas the individualsin publictake the new definition for grantedas partof theirworldview. We applaudConradand Schneider's explicit sociologyof knowledgeand find their social constructionist approachinsig htful. Their analysisof the historical contribution a dimensionsof the medicalization deviancerepresents significant of in by placingdeviancedesignations the broadersocial context. At the sametime, we are uncomfortable with the apparentabsenceof a theoreticalmodel pointing to a more explicit method of data analysis. History is all aroundus; we need the guidanceto separate datafromthe noise. between In his Ideology and Utopia (1936), Karl Mannheimdistinguishes two types of sociologyof knowledge:†on the one hand a theoryand on the other hand an historical-sociological methodof research†(p. 266). As a theorywith the sociology of knowledgehas been pursuedvigepistemologicalimplications, orously. Its methodologicalimplicationshave, however, remainedunderdevelhimselflargelyignoredthe methodological aspectsof knowledge oped. Mannheim theory, though he did write that â€Å"the most important task of the sociology of knowledge at present is to demonstrate its capacity in actual research in the historical-sociological realm† (p. 306). The methodological implications of Mannheim's work have been pursued most CreatingDeviance Rules 163 rigorouslyby David Bloor in his 1976 book Knowledgeand Social Imagery. Bloor contendsthat our concernshouldbe phenomenological; method,howour scientific. Thesociologistis concernedwith knowlever, ought to be rigorously edge,† he writes, â€Å"purelyas a naturalphenomenon†¦ instead of definingit as true or false belief, knowledgefor the sociologist is whatevermen take to be knowledge†(p. 2). Given that knowledgeis relativeand historicallyunstable, Bloor's task is to elucidatethe materialbasis of its variation. To accomplishthis in task, he proposesa methodwhich he calls the â€Å"strong program† the sociology of knowledge,to wit, that our analysisought to be causal, impartial,and symmetrical. While sociologists would not want to argue that social factors are the sole cause of belief, they should focus on how social conditionsproduceand reflect belief. In demandingan approachwhich is â€Å"impartial with respectto truthand success or failure†(p. 5), Bloor is not advofalsity, rationalityor irrationality, catinga value neutralposition. The task is not to crownwinnersor punishlosers but to understandboth sides. In that sense, Bloor's sociology is agnostic. Ultito even irrelevant, mate truth,in any sense of the phrase,is seen as peripheral, the analysis. Finally the strong programdemandsa symmetrical analysis. Too often scholarshave attempted analyzedeviantand normalbeliefs from differto ent stances, the former needing special explanation,while the latter–seen as logical, rational,or truthful-are seen to need no specialexplanation. We are interestedin using the sociology of knowledgeas a methodological to guide, as a way of using historicalmaterials build rigorousmodels. In a sense, then, we use Mannheimand Bloor to build a theoreticalmethod for empirical methods,especiallyas it appliesto socialhistory, study. The notion of theoretical has been developedby Stinchcombe(1978; see also Graff, 1980). Good social theory, he asserts,must be groundedin historicaldata. â€Å"Peopledo much better the theory,†he argues,†wheninterpreting historicalsequencethanthey do when they set out to do ‘theory'† (p. 17) and â€Å"thatthe centraloperationfor building theories of history is seeking causally significantanalogiesbetween instances† of Thuswe aremost interested the methodological in implications the sociology of knowledge:as a way of pointingtowardvariables,as a way of using history, as a way-in short-of structuring analysis. Suchan analyticstrategy,as a macroand rigorousversionof groundedtheory,ought to allow us to relateprescopic vious theoriesof devianceand our data in an iterativesort of way and, thus, to build and evaluatea model of how deviantcategoriesare designated. A DialecticalModelof DevianceDesignation In attemptingto addressthe theoreticaland methodologicalissues raised, we propose a dialecticalmodel of deviance designation. The model, presentedin to however,it attempts transcend Figure1, is influenced resourcemobilization; by arany single theory. We begin with the assumptionthat within the structural is composedof a numberof generalinterestsin varying rangements, everysociety degreesof conflict. Such groupsmay be of varyingnature:with inclusiveor exin clusive membership, broad or narrowfocus. Their concernwith the definition (p. 7). Figure 1. A DialecticalModel of DevianceDefiniti General vested & other interests Definition i – +- Strain General vested & other interests S/ Specific interests CreatingDeviance Rules 165 question,however,is either peripheral,quiescent,or not effectivein the public arena. The initial or prevailingdefinitionof a behavioras acceptableor unacceptable representsthe outcome of previousspecific interestgroup conflict;in other words, the balanceof the resourcesthe two sides were able to mobilize. or This balance or accommodation becomes vulnerablewith the introduction increase of strain. This developmentprovides existing general interest groups with a new resourceand opportunity claims-making. for Specificinterestgroups towardthe specific (includingthe state) form,or mobilize,or becomeredirected issue in question. Faced with a challenge to their interests,groups benefiting from the prevailingdefinitionrespondby marshaling their own resources. The battle of these groups to maintainor change a rule is joined, the outcome dependingon the balance of the mobilizedresources. To speak of the â€Å"balanceof mobilized resources†should not be seen as merely suggestinga simplisticaccountingbalance. Of coursethe matteris muchmore complex. For example,the efficientemployment resources–usingresourcesin an arenawherethey have of maximal impact-may be just as importantas quantity. The net result is that over a periodof time, at time2,the originaldefinitionsurvivesor a new designation takesits place. for In explicatingthe model, we make the following arguments its utility in collectivedefinition deviance: of examining issues raisedin the 1. The model addressesor handlesmanyof the theoretical literature. For example, existing sociological explanations assign central importance to, or ignore, the role of strain. The dialectical model directs the scholar'sattentionto the role of strainbut does not preclude,in fact demands, examinationof other social processes. In addition,by viewing the state as an interestedparty, albeit a group with unique resources,it is possibleto examine official actions without assumingthe existence of an all powerfulmonolithical the definitional outcomes. Furthermore, modelpermitsanalysis entitydetermining and explanationof outcomeswhereneitherside achievestotal victory. in 2. The dialecticalmodel is consistentwith the â€Å"strong program† the sociology of knowledge. As Bloor (1976) has requested,this modelis causal,impartial, and symmetrical. Figure 1 is time ordered;that is, variablesappearin causal sequence with one another. Moreoverthese sequences are made explicit, thus data analysis. The model thus allowsfor attemptsat statisticalmodelfacilitating of processvariablesby techniquesdevelopedfrom social factisttraditions. ing The model treats deviance rule creationsas naturalphenomena. Whethera rule is good or bad is irrelevant our analysis. RecallingGusfield'sstudyof the to temperancemovement,the validityof analysiswas independentof truthclaims about alcohol. Whetherthe drug is actuallyan aphrodisiac,a depressant,or a tool of the devil was essentiallyirrelevantto his conclusions. Taking such an it agnosticpositionhas methodological implications: allowsfor the formalmodelvariables. Moreover,Bloor'slast dictum-that analysis ing of phenomenological be symmetrical–hasobvious implicationsfor the dialecticalmodel. Note that interestsfor or againstany definitionare handledin the same way, and have the same causal input into the model. 166 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY 3. The model is dialectical. The theoryis timelessand has no end stage. Figure 1 shows only one referenceframe. But upon acceptanceof â€Å"Definition2,† general vested or other interestsare alreadyin place, advocatingfor or againsta new definition. Though the theory is sequential,in the sense that it goes forwardin remainuntime, the units of time are not specified. Some deviancedesignations for long periods of time, others move more rapidlythroughstages of changed and vindication. Conradand Schneider,thinkingalong the same stigmatization of and demedicalization deviance the lines, have conceptualized medicalization as â€Å"cyclical†(1980:271). We preferto use the termdialectical,in that it leaves ratherthan suggestinga rethe directionof the next redefinition problematic as turnto an originalpoint. nor4. Deviance and normalcyare not distinctcategories. We conceptualize coordinatesystem. As a prescribed as a point in a multidimensional guide malcy for conduct, a rule designatesthe limits of space aroundthe point in which a behavioris seen as deviant. behavioris viewed as normal. Outsidethis boundary, Now we can justify using the terms â€Å"rulecreation†and â€Å"deviancedesignation† more or less synonymously. The formerrefersto the boundaryitself, whichmay be thick or fuzzy; the latter refers to the space outside the boundary. Any behavioralboundary,in our view, is subject to cultural,temporal,or situational between factorswhich continuously defineit, or redefineit. Thus is the boundary deviancy and normalcycontinuouslydrawnand redrawn,and a behavioralresituation,but ratherby definitionoccursnot by quantumleaps, as an â€Å"either-or† or pulled througha system of space. In the dialecticalmodel the being pushed as pushesor pulls aremanifested strainor process. and analyticintentions 5. The model is macroscopic. Our conceptualization the collectivelevel. We do not directlyconsider,for example,the are clearly at motivationsof an individualactor or leader. For two reasonswe down-playthe importof, or perhapseven ignore,such questionsas: Did leaderX makedecision or Y sincerelyor cynically? Is he or she a moralentrepreneur a typical (but not concernedsuburbanite? First,we doubt,in social factistlanguage, authoritarian) that such variablesexplainvery much variancein deviancedesignation. The individual,qua individual,role in collective, historicprocessesis always limited. To Our second reasonis methodological: the extentthat psychologicalvariables are important,how are they to be measuredor assessed? For historicalstudies, motivationseems particularly Secondarysources,as well as various problematic. kinds of documents,seem suspecthere. Even in contemporary settings,people's of their own or others'motivationsare not trustworthy, especiallygiven reports or the vested or strategicinterestswhich can be served by lying, exaggerating, selectivelyforgetting. Rather,we focus on such variablesas strainand resources over time. and which can be operationalized measuredcomparably 6. The dialecticalmodel uses history. The model invites, perhapseven demands, a given rule to be placed in historical context. Moreover the data needed to test the model are historical, preferably in time series, data. The model is shaped by these data and is thus grounded and inductive as Conrad and Schnei- CreatingDeviance Rules 167 der (1980:265) have suggested. In that sense the dialecticalmodel is meant to evaluate,as much as formallytest, historicalsequencesof data. 7. The model is conflictoriented,though not necessarilyMarxist. Many deviance designations,particularlythose formalizedas laws, are amenableto a Marxist analysis consistentwith the model. Large sums of money or other resources are often used by ruling elites for maintenanceof deviance definitions do or, less often, change. However,some deviancedefinitions not seem to fit the Marxistmodel (see Markle and Troyer, 1979, or Hagan and Leon, 1977, for two such case studies). In the dialecticalmodel, vested or other interests(religious, ethnic, sex, status,etc. ) can militatefor, and indeedbe successfulat, creat(uneming new definitionsof deviance. Similarlystrainmightbe substructural strain ployment,new technology,etc. ), but the model allows for superstructural (e. g. , new knowledge). Using the DialecticalModel As an inductivetheory,the true test of the dialecticalmodel is its utility. Let us and suggesta few ways, then, how the model mightbe operationalized used. We in begin with the concept of strain,which can be operationalized severalways. In our own researchon cigarettesmoking(Markleand Troyer,1979) and estrolegen replacements(McCrea and Markle, 1980), strainwas the appearance, or dissemination new knowledge; strainin our researchon Laetrile of gitimation, (Markle and Petersen, 1980) was, among other factors, an increasedconcern over cancer. As new health-related knowledgeclaims, strain can be measured with variousbibliometric techniques. A simple content analysisof relevantarticles, over a period of years, from Index Medicus can be used to chart such knowledgeclaims. The perceivedlegitimacyof such claims can be assessedby the professionalprestige of the author or journal. Finally, the entry of such knowledgeclaims into the public arena can be measuredusing the New York Times Index, which Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found highly effective,or by one of severalnewspaperdata banks (e. g. , Newsbank)now in existence. After looking at strain,it is easy enoughto identifyspecificinterestsinvolved in redefinition. Such organizations groups will have appearedas recipients, or sponsors,aggrievedparties,etc. , in news accountsor scholarlycitation. The resources of these groups can be measuredin severalways. The Encyclopediaof Associations, updated almost yearly, lists purportedmembershipsand other for simple demographics manysuchgroups. Moreover,most interestgroupshave which are usuallyeasy to obtain, often at literatureor even regularpublications no cost. When interests are corporate,much informationon resourcescan be gleaned from annual reports or, with somewhatmore effort, from regulatory In agenciessuch as the Securitiesand ExchangeCommission. ase studieswhere is an interestedparty, vast amounts of official statistics may be government available (see, e. g. , Markle and Troyer, 1979). Moreover,the researchercan use the Freedomof Information Act to obtain a deep windowinto government actions and resourcesin variousdeviancedesignations. Throughpublic records and other availabledata, every conce pt in the dialecticalmodel can be operationalized. Indeed,to measureresourcesin comparable ways, we have suggested of the development a researchprotocol (Markleand Petersen,1981). 168 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY A Final Word iancearecreated changed, beenneglected socialtheory research. and or in has We believethat neglectcomes from theoretical The misdirection. dialectical thesedifficulties. to model,whichis knowledge based,is ourattempt ameliorate Becauseit attempts integrate traditional the theoryinvites to two approaches, both philosophical- empirical-based and criticisms. Thoughwe welcomethe we The in interested thelatter. realtestof thedialectical former, areparticularly modelis whether works. it Andwhether not it workscan onlybe judged or by it holdingit up to the lightof, and adjudicating with,historicaland contemporary A crucialelementof social change and conflict,why and how definitionsof de- research. REFERENCES Barnes, Barry. 1974. ScientificKnowledgeand SociologicalTheory. London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul. Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders:Studiesin the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press. and the critiqueof Marxismon law and crime. † Social Problems26:373Beirne, Piers. 1979. â€Å"Empiricism 85. Berger, Peter L. , and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Constructionof Reality. Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday. Block, Fred. 1978. â€Å"The rulingclass does not rule. † Pp. 128-40 in RichardQuinney,ed. CapitalistSociety: Readingsfor a CriticalSociology. Homewood,Ill. : Dorsey. Bloor, David. 1976. Knowledgeand Social Imagery. London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul. Blummer,Herbert. 1962. â€Å"Society as symbolic interaction. â€Å"Pp. 179-92 in Arnold Rose, ed. , Human Behaviorand Social Processes. Boston:HoughtonMiffltin. 1971. â€Å"Socialproblemsas collectivebehavior. â€Å"Socia l Problems18:298-306. —. Chambliss,William J. 1964. â€Å"A sociologicalanalysisof the law of vagrancy. â€Å"Social Problems12:67-77. . 1974. â€Å"The state, the law, and the definitionof behavior as criminalor delinquent. â€Å"Pp. 7-42 in Daniel Glaser, ed. Handbookof Criminology. Bobbs-Merrill. Indianapolis: Collins, Randall. 1975. ConflictSociology: TowardAn ExplanatoryScience. New York: AcademicPress. Conrad, Peter. 1975. â€Å"The discovery of hyperkinesis:notes on the medicalizationof deviant behavior. † Social Problems23:12-21. , and JosephW. Schneider. 1980. Deviance and Medicalization:From Badnessto Sickness. St. Louis: Mosby. Davis, F. James. 1975. â€Å"Beliefs, values, power, and public definitionsof deviance. â€Å"Pp. 50-59 in F. James Davis and RichardStivers,eds. , The CollectiveDefinitionof Deviance. New York: Free Press. of Davis, Nanette J. 980. SociologicalConstruction Deviance:Perspectivesand Issues in the Field. 2d ed. Dubuque,Iowa: Wm. C . Brown. and morality:an organizational perspectiveon a moral crusade. † Dickson, Donald T. 1968. â€Å"Bureaucracy Social Problems16:143-56. Freidson,Eliot. 1970. Proessionof Medicine. New York: Dodd, Mead. Galliher,John F. 1978. â€Å"The politics of systematicresearcherror: the case of the Federal Bureauof Narcotics as a moralentrepreneur. † Crimeand Social Justice10:29-33. , and Allyn Walter. 1977. â€Å"The puzzle of the social origins of the MarihuanaTax Act of 1937. † Social Problems24:367-76. TheoreticalMethodsin Social History. American Graft, Harvey J. 1980. Review of ArthurJ. Stinchcombe, Journalof Sociology85:1442-46. Gusfield, Joseph. 1963. Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the AmericanTemperanceMovement. Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press. -. 1967. â€Å"Moral passage: the symbolic process in public designationsof deviance. â€Å"Social Problems 15:175-88. delinquency:social history, political ideology, and Hagan, John, and Jeffery Leon. 1977. â€Å"Rediscovering the sociologyof law. † AmericanSociologicalReview42:587-98. CreatingDevianceRules 169 Hawkins, Richard, and Gard Tiedman. 975. The Creation of Deviance. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill. Jenkins, J. Craig, and Charles Perrow. 1977. â€Å"Insurgencyand the powerless: farm worker movements (1946-1972). â€Å"AmericanSociologicalReview42:249-68. Lauderdale,Pat, ed. 1980. A Political Analysis of Deviance. Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress. , and James Inverarity. 1980a. â€Å"From apoli ticalto political analysesof deviance. â€Å"Pp. 15-44 in Pat Lauderdale,ed. , A Political Analysis of Deviance. Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress. . 1980b. â€Å"Afterword: suggestionfor the study of the political dimensionsof deviancedefinition. Pp. 221-37 in Pat Lauderdale, ed. , A Political Analysisof Deviance. Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota. Levine, Harry Gene. 1978. â€Å"The discoveryof addiction: changingconceptionsof habitual drunkenness in America. â€Å"Journalof Studieson Alcohol 39:143-74. McCrea, Frances B. , and Gerald E. Markle. 1981. â€Å"The estrogen replacementcontroversyin the United States and Great Britain: differentanswersto the same question? â€Å"Paper presentedat the AnnualMeeting of the Societyfor the Social Studiesof Science,Toronto. Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. Translatedby Louis With and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt,Brace and World. Markle, Gerald E. , and James C. Petersen. 1980. Politics, Science, and Cancer: The LaetrilePhenomenon. Boulder,Colo. : WestviewPress. , 1981. â€Å"Controversiesin science and technology: a protocol for comparativeresearch. † Science Technologyand HumanValues 6:25-30. Markle, Gerald C. , and Ronald J. Troyer. 1979. â€Å"Smoke gets in your eyes: cigarettesmoking as deviant behavior. â€Å"Social Problems26:611-25. J. Mauss, ArmandL. 1975. Social Problemsas Social Movements. Philadelphia: B. Lippincott. Sociology6:602-606. . 1977. Reviewof social problemsbooks. Contemporary , and Julie Camile Wolfe. 1977. This Land of Promises. Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott. of Neuhring, Elaine, and Gerald E. Markle. 1974. â€Å"Nicotine and norms: the re-emergence a deviant behavior. † Social Problems21:513-26. Oberschall,Anthony. 1973. Social Conflictand Social Movements. EnglewoodCliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall. Pfohl, StephenJ. 1977. â€Å"The discoveryof child abuse. † Social Problems24:310-23. Platt, Anthony M. 1969. The Child Savers: The Inventionof Delinquency. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. 1974. â€Å"The triumphof benevolence:the originsof the juvenilejustice systemin the United States. -. Pp. 356-89 in RichardQuinney,ed. , CriminalJusticein America. Boston: Little, Brownand Company. Ritzer, George. 1975. Sociology: A MultipleParadigmScience. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Roby, Pamela A. 1969. â€Å"Politics and criminallaw: revisionof the New York State penal law on prostitution. † Social Problems17:83-109. Rose, Vicki McNic kle. 1977. â€Å"The rise of the rape problem. â€Å"Pp. 167-95 in ArmandL. Mauss and Julie CamileWolfe, eds. , This Land of Promises. Philadelphia: B. Lippincott. J. Social Schneider,Joseph W. 1978. â€Å"Deviant drinkingas disease: alcoholismas a social accomplishment. Problems25:361-72. Schur,EdwinM. 1980. The Politics of Deviance: StigmaContestsand the Uses of Power. EnglewoodCliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall. Smelser, Neil J. 1962. Theory of CollectiveBehavior. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. Social Problems. Menlo Park, Calif. : Cummings. Spector,Malcolm,and John T. Kitsuse. 1977. Constructing Stinchcombe,ArthurL. 1978. TheoreticalMethodsin Social History. New York: AcademicPress. Robert G. Cushing,and CharlesG. Bowman. 1977. â€Å"The antiZurcher,Louis A. , R. George Kirkpatrick, a pornography campaign: symboliccrusade. â€Å"Social Problems19:217-38.